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On the Equivalence of Location Choice Models: 





It is well understood that the two most popular empirical models of location choice - 
conditional logit and Poisson - return identical coefficient estimates when the regressors are 
not individual specific. We show that these two models differ starkly in terms of their implied 
predictions. The conditional logit model represents a zero-sum world, in which one region's 
gain is the other regions' loss. In contrast, the Poisson model implies a positive-sum economy, 
in which one region's gain is no other region's loss. We also show that all intermediate cases 
can be represented as a nested logit model with a single outside option. The nested logit turns 
out to be a linear combination of the conditional logit and Poisson models. Conditional logit 
and Poisson elasticities mark the polar cases and can therefore serve as boundary values in 
applied research. 
JEL Code: C25, R30, H73. 
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Location choices by households and rms are of interest to economists for numerous reasons,
ranging from the determinants of residential segregation patterns in cities to the design of
national tax policy. Given the discrete nature of such choices, they are typically modelled
by empirical researchers through McFadden's (1974) conditional logit framework.1 The ap-
peal of this approach lies in its formal link between the theoretical objective function of a
representative location-seeking agent and the likelihood function of the empirical model.
Mostly out of a perception of greater computational ease, researchers have resorted to
Poisson count estimation as an alternative approach to the conditional logit.2 Guimaraes,
Figueiredo and Woodward (2003), henceforth GFW, have shown that, with purely location-
specic locational determinants or with determinants that are specic to locations and to
groups of agents, the conditional logit and Poisson estimators return identical parameter
estimates. In this sense, the two estimators are equivalent, and the rigorous link to the theory
oered by the conditional logit model therefore applies identically to the Poisson. This useful
result has already been applied widely in the location choice literature.3
We show that the identical coecient estimates resulting from the two estimation strate-
gies in fact have fundamentally dierent economic implications. The conditional logit model
implies that the aggregate number of agents is xed and that dierences across locations aect
only the distribution of those agents across those locations. Hence, an additional agent at-
tracted to location j means one less agent among the other locations in the relevant set, i 6= j.
In the Poisson model, however, an additional agent attracted to location j has no impact
on the number of agents in the remaining locations and thus raises the aggregate number of
agents, summed across i and j, by one. Thus, the conditional logit model and the Poisson
model can be viewed as polar cases, with the former representing zero-sum reallocations of
rms or households across locations and the latter implying a positive-sum world.4
We also show that intermediate cases between these two extremes can be represented by
a nested logit model featuring a generic outside option. This approach returns the same
1For studies of rm location choices using the conditional logit approach, see, e.g., Carlton (1983), Head, Ries
and Swenson (1995), Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward (2000), Head and Mayer (2004), Crozet, Mayer
and Mucchielli (2004), and Devereux, Grith and Simpson (2007). For corresponding studies of household
location chocies, see, e.g., Ellickson (1981), Quigley (1985), Nechyba and Strauss (1998), Schmidheiny (2006),
and Bayer, Ferreira and McMillan (2007).
2See, e.g., Papke (1991), Becker and Henderson (2000), List (2001), Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward
(2004), and Holl (2004), for studies of rms' location choices; and Flowerdew and Aitkin (1982) and B orsch-
Supan (1990) for studies of individual migration choices.
3Recent studies invoking the GFW equivalence result include Duranton, Gobillon and Overman (2006),
Br ulhart, Jametti and Schmidheiny (2007), Arzaghi and Henderson (2008), Davis and Henderson (2008), and
Coeurdacier, De Santis and Aviat (2009).
4For recent research on the cross-region eects of region-specic policies aimed at attracting rms, see, e.g.,
Greenstone and Moretti (2003), Chirinko and Wilson (2008), and Wilson (2009).
2parameter estimates as the two other estimators. The nested logit in fact can be written
as a linear combination of the conditional logit and Poisson models, with a single \rivalness
parameter" representing the closeness of the nested logit to the conditional logit (and thus
the distance from the Poisson). Conditional logit and Poisson elasticities mark the polar cases
and can therefore serve as boundary values in applied research.
The paper is structured as follows. In Section 2, we formally derive the commonalities
and dierences among the conditional logit, Poisson and nested logit models. Empirical
implications and an illustration are presented in Section 3. Section 4 concludes.
2 The models
We denote agents with f = 1;:::;N and regions with j = 1;:::;J. For simplicity, we shall
frame our discussion in terms of corporate location decisions, and therefore relate to f as
\rms".
Following GFW, we rst assume the determinants of locational attractiveness to be purely
region specic, such that they aect all rms symmetrically (case A). The K observable
characteristics of each region are given by the (K1) vector xj. We then relax this assumption,
and allow locational attractiveness to be region-industry specic (case B).
The random variable nj represents the count of rms in region j, whereas Nj denotes the
number of rms actually observed in region j. Analogously, the random variable n represents
the total number of rms, whereas N denotes the observed total number of rms.
2.1 Case A: industry-invariant locational determinants
2.1.1 Conditional logit
Suppose that rm f's prot in region j is determined by the linear model fj = x0
j + "fj,
where  is a (K 1) vector of coecients. Then, the conditional logit model is dened by the
assumption that the random term "fj is independent across f and j and follows an extreme-
value type 1 distribution. With this assumption, the probability that a given rm f chooses
region j rather than another region is given by









j Pjjf = 1 for all f. Since locational characteristics xj are assumed here to aect all
rms symmetrically, this probability also represents the share of rms that will choose region
j.

















The conditional logit model implicitly assumes that the total number of rms n is given
and does not depend on the locational characteristics x. The expected number of rms in
region j, E(nj) is therefore simply







The percentage change in the expected number of rms in region j, E(nj), with respect





= (1   Pj)k: (4)
Similarly, the percentage change in the expected number of rms in another region, E(ni6=j),






For simplicity, we shall henceforth refer to these and all subsequently presented semi-
elasticities as \elasticities". Hence, all \elasticities" derived and calculated in this paper in
fact are semi-elasticities.
The own-region elasticity (4) shows that by enhancing its attractiveness a region will in-
crease its expected number of rms, and the cross-region elasticity (5) implies that one region's
increased attractiveness to rms will reduce the number of rms choosing other regions: one
region's gain is another region's loss. Moreover, a simple comparison of the two elasticities
shows that small regions (in terms of Pj, the share of rms they host) are predicted by the
conditional logit model to nd their own rm counts to be relatively elastic to changes in
their own locational characteristics, while not aecting rm counts in other regions as much
as large regions.
We now turn from the viewpoint of individual regions to an analysis of what the conditional




E(nj) = n = N: (6)
Hence, the expected total number of rms is equal to the observed total, N, irrespective
of regressors and parameters. This again shows the \zero sum" aspect of the conditional logit
model, where the implied problem is one of allocating an exogenously xed number of rms
over a set of regions. It also follows logically that changes in the locational attractiveness of
individual regions will not aect the total number of rms. Formally, the elasticity of the
expected total rm count relative to a change in one of the K locational characteristics of any



























logNj!   N + N logN: (8)
When comparing this to (2), the point made by GFW is plain to see: the log likelihood
functions of the two models are identical up to a constant, and maximum likelihood estimation
therefore yields identical parameter estimates ^ .


















which is exactly the same expression as (1), for the conditional logit model. This equivalence
lies at the heart of the GFW result:
Observation 1 (Guimaraes, Figueiredo and Woodward, 2003) The log likelihood func-
tions for the conditional logit and the Poisson model are identical up to a constant, and max-
imum likelihood estimation therefore yields identical parameter estimates ^ .
5The elasticity of the expected number of rms in region j, E(nj), with respect to a change
in the k-th locational characteristic of region j itself, and by that of another region i 6= j, is










Comparing these elasticities to their conditional-logit equivalents (4) and (5), we observe
the following dierences.
Observation 2 The Poisson model implies more elastic responses by rm counts to given
changes in own-region characteristics than the conditional logit model.
Observation 3 Unlike in the conditional logit model, in the Poisson model, one region's
change in locational attractiveness has no impact on the number of rms located among any
of the J   1 other regions.
Hence, even though the estimated parameters ^  will be invariant to the choice of model,
their implied predictions dier starkly. The conditional logit model implies a zero-sum allo-
cation process of a xed number of rms over the J jurisdictions. In contrast, in the Poisson
model new rms are non-rivalrous, in the sense that adjustment to one regions's locational
characteristics works not through changes in rm numbers among the J   1 other regions
but from changes either in the supply of local entrepreneurship or in rms attracted from or
repelled to somewhere outside the considered set of J regions.
Moving again from the viewpoint of individual regions to an analysis of the model's im-













Comparing this expression with its conditional logit equivalent (6), we note that the
expected total number of rms is now not generally equal to the observed total number of
rms, N, but depends on the regressors and parameters.5 The Poisson model thus implies
that a change in a region's locational attractiveness will aect the sum of rms active in the
5Note that the predicted total number of rms at the estimated coecients and actual data corresponds to
the observed total of rms in the Poisson model just as it does in the conditional logit model. In symbols,
E(nj^ ; ^ ) = N.
6J regions. Specically, the elasticity of the expected total rm count with respect to a change














Observation 4 In the Poisson model, an increase (decrease) in one region's locational at-
tractiveness increases (decreases) the total of rms summed across the J regions. In the
conditional logit model, a change in one region's locational attractiveness leaves the total of
rms summed across the J regions unchanged.
2.1.3 Nested logit
Observations 2, 3 and 4 show that the two models are the polar cases of a continuum of
relative adjustment margins, ranging from reallocations purely within the set of alternatives
considered (conditional logit) to reallocations purely between that set and some outside option
(Poisson). We now turn to a micro-founded approach that covers this whole continuum and
thus encompasses the polar cases.
Suppose that rms make two sequential choices. At the rst stage, they choose between
locating in one of the J regions considered (which could stand for \domestic" regions) and an
outside option j = 0 (which could stand for locating \abroad" or for remaining inactive). At
the second stage, they pick one of the J regions. Like in the conditional logit model, rm f's
prot in region j > 0 is determined by a linear function of the region-specic characteristics
xj, such that fj = x0
j + fj. Firm f's prot associated with the outside option is given
by f0 =  + f0, where  summarizes the exogenously xed locational attractiveness of the
outside option. The stochastic term f0 is assumed to follow a generalized extreme value
distribution as in McFadden (1978).7 This leads to a nested logit model with one degenerate
\nest" that includes j = 0 only and one other \nest" that includes all regions j > 0. This




across fj for all j > 0; where 0 <   1, sometimes called the \log-sum"
coecient, measures the importance of the domestic nest as a whole relative to the outside
option.

















in both the conditional logit and the Poisson model.






















i) = Pj>0  Pjjj>0;
where we reparametrize  = =. This implies that, unlike in the conditional logit, the esti-
mated regression parameters b  are not identical to the structural parameters of the underlying
prot function.
The choice probabilities Pj can be decomposed into (a) the probability of choosing any
of the J regions, Pj>0 = 1   P0, and (b) the probability of choosing a specic region j given








The parameter  can again be estimated by maximum likelihood. We can write the












i)]+N0 log(N0)+N log(N) (N +N0)log(N +N0);
where  and  cancel out when we substitute the rst-order condition @ logL=@ = 0 into
L(;;).8 N is the number of rms locating in any of the regions j > 0, and N0 is the
number of rms choosing the outside option j = 0. Note that  can be estimated without
observing N0.
Observation 5 The log likelihood functions for the conditional logit, the Poisson and the
nested logit model with a single outside option are identical up to a constant, and maximum
likelihood estimation therefore yields identical parameter estimates ^ .
The ratio (13) is identical to its equivalents in the conditional logit and Poisson models,
(1) and (9). This correspondence among the three models lies at the heart of Observation 5,
which extends the GFW result to the nested logit case with a single outside option.
8This expression is obtained as follows:









































] = 0. The
estimated ^  can therefore be expressed as a function of the estimated ^  and ^ : e






When we substitute e
^  in logL(;;),  also cancels out.
8The expected number of rms in region j > 0 is











The own-region elasticity of the expected number of rms, E(nj), relative to locational char-




= [1   Pjjj>0(1   P0)]k; (15)




=  Pjjj>0(1   P0)k: (16)
We can now compare the own- and cross-region elasticities of the three models. Simple
inspection of elasticities (4), (5), (10), (11), (15) and (16) leads to the following observation.
Observation 6 The nested-logit own-region and cross-region elasticities lie between their con-
ditional logit and Poisson counterparts.
Once more, we now move from the analysis of rm counts in individual regions to the
total number of rms that are active in the J regions. Using (14) and (12), we nd that











= (n + n0)Pj>0:
The expected total number of rms active in the J regions is simply given by the share of
potential rms that decide to become active in one of those regions. As in the Poisson model,
the expected total number of rms is not generally equal to the observed total number of rms,
N, but depends on the regressors and parameters, including those for the outside option.9
The elasticity of the expected total rm count relative to a change in one of the K locational















Observation 7 Like the Poisson, the nested logit model implies that a change in a region's
locational attractiveness will aect the total of rms summed across the J regions.
Here, the responsiveness of the aggregate rm number is due to the eect on the decisions
9As in the Poisson and conditional logit models, the predicted total number of rms among the J regions
at the estimated coecients and actual data corresponds to the observed total: E(nj^ ; ^ ; ^ ) = N.
9Table 1: Comparing implied elasticities (case A)
Conditional Logit Nested Logit Poisson
jj =
@ logE(nj)
@xjk (1   Pjjj>0)k [1   Pjjj>0(1   P0)]k k
ij =
@ logE(ni)
@xjk  Pjjj>0k  Pjjj>0(1   P0)k 0
j =
@ logE(n)
@xjk 0 P0Pjjj>0k Pjjj>0k
Notes: Pjjj>0 = E(nj)=E(n), P0 = E(n0)=E(n + n0)
taken by rms that would have chosen the outside option in the absence of a change in regional
attractiveness.
2.1.4 A synthesis of the three models
We can now pull together the salient features of the three models. First, we consider the
impact of a change in the attractiveness of an individual region on the number of rms in that
region and across the J   1 remaining regions. Table 1 gathers the own-region, cross-region
and aggregate elasticities implied by the three models.
In order to compare these elasticities, we dene  = 1   P0 which satises 0    1
under the standard nested logit assumption 0 <   1. We call  the rivalness parameter.
It allows us to write the nested logit elasticities as a linear combination of their conditional













j . The rivalness parameter therefore acts as a summary measure of the position of
the data generating process between the two polar cases, conditional logit ( = 1) and Poisson
( = 0). One may think of  as capturing of the relative importance of the outside option: as
 ! 0, competition among the J regions becomes unimportant relative to the weight of the
outside option, while with  ! 1, the outside option becomes negligible and any reallocations
have to occur within the set of the J regions.
We can also establish rankings of the elasticities implied by the three models. Provided
that  6= 0, the ranking of own-region elasticities is (c.f. Observations 2 and 6)
jPoisson
jj j > j
nlogit
jj j > j
clogit
jj j > 0;
while the ranking of cross-regions elasticities is just the reverse (c.f. Observations 3 and 6),
j
clogit
ij j > j
nlogit
ij j > jPoisson
ij j = 0:
10and the ranking of aggregate elasticities is again (c.f. Observations 4 and 7)
jPoisson
j j > j
nlogit
j j > j
clogit
j j > 0:
2.2 Case B: industry-specic locational determinants
Consider now that we observe K characteristics xsj for every region j and industry s. Hence,
we again do not observe rm-specic regional attributes, but we now allow for these attributes
to dier across groups of rms, best thought of as industries. We maintain the notation xj
for the subset of locational determinants that are constant across industries. Furthermore,
njs is the number of rms in region j and industry s, ns is the observed number of industry-s
rms across all regions, n is the total number of rms, and N stands for the corresponding
observed rm count in the sample.
The grouped conditional logit model is given by the probability that a given rm f of
industry s chooses region j rather than another region:









j Pjjf = 1. Pjjs is the probability for a particular rm to choose region j given that
the rm belongs to industry s.




where s is an industry-specic constant.
Finally, the grouped nested logit model is given by the probability that a given rm f of



























si) = Pj>0js  Pjjj>0;s = (1   P0js)Pjjj>0;s;
where s is an industry-specic constant, and  = =. Pj>0js = 1   P0js is the probability
11Table 2: Comparing implied elasticities (case B)
Conditional Logit Nested Logit Poisson
Region-industry specic regressor xsjk:
(a)
@ log E(nsj)
@xsjk k(1   Pjjj>0;s) k[1   Pjjj>0;s(1   P0js)] k
(b)
@ log E(nsi)
@xsjk  kPjjj>0;s  kPjjj>0;s(1   P0js) 0
(c)
@ log E(ns)
@xsjk 0 kPjjj>0;sP0js kPjjj>0;s
(d)
@ log E(nj)
@xsjk k(1   Pjjj>0;s)Psjj k[1   Pjjj>0;s(1   P0js)]Psjj kPsjj
(e)
@ log E(ni)
@xsjk  kPjjj>0;sPsji  kPjjj>0;s(1   P0js)Psji 0
(f)
@ log E(n)
@xsjk 0 kPsjjPjP0js kPsjjPjjj>0





s=1(1   Pjjj>0;s)Psjj k
PS













Notes: Pjjj>0;s = E(nsj)=E(ns), P0js = E(ns0)=E(ns + ns0), Psjj = E(nsj)=E(nj). Psjj is the
fraction of rms in industry s in a given region j.








is the probability that such a rm chooses a particular domestic region conditional on not
choosing the outside option.
As in case A, the three models are observationally equivalent in a cross section of domestic
rm choices and yield identical estimates for the parameter vector . This has been shown
by GFW for the grouped conditional logit and the grouped Poisson models, and we show it
in the Appendix for the grouped nested logit model.
Table 2 summarizes the implied elasticities in the three grouped models (see the Ap-
pendix for derivations). As in case A, the elasticities in the grouped nested logit model
are (industry-specic) linear combinations of their conditional logit and Poisson equivalents:
nlogit
:: = sclogit
:: + (1   s)Poisson
:: where s = 1   P0js.
123 Estimation
3.1 Elasticity bounds
We have shown that estimation of any of the three models will yield identical parameter es-
timates b . The additional parameters ,  and  in the nested logit model are not identied
but irrelevant for the estimation of . Hence, it is impossible to discriminate formally between
these three model based on cross-section data. And yet, the implied elasticities dier sub-
stantially. In previous research, reported elasticities were based either on the conditional logit
model or the Poisson model, without justication of the particular choice made or, mistakenly
in this respect, by referring to the equivalence of the two models as established by GFW.
What can researchers do if they are not willing to make this choice by assumption but
rely on cross-sectional data? We propose in this situation that one calculate the elasticities
of both the conditional logit and the Poisson model and report these predictions as bounds
for the true eects. As shown in Observation 6, intermediate values can be rationalized by a
nested logit model.
The computation of both conditional logit and Poisson elasticities requires that one calcu-








i ^  ; (18)

























ri ^ : (21)
3.2 An example
By way of an illustration, we take the data on location choices in Portugal by foreign-owned
plants used in Guimaraes et al. (2000, 2003), and we report the elasticities implied by the
coecients of their regression model. The data cover a cross section of 758 location choices
among 275 Portuguese regions by rms belonging to one of 151 industries.10 Their region-
industry level regressor of main interest, xsjk, is \industry-specic agglomeration", dened as
10We follow GFW by referring to industry-year pairs as \industries". The 151 industries in their data set
are combinations of 27 three-digit manufacturing sectors and seven sample years, ranging from 1985 to 1991.
13Table 3: Comparing implied elasticities in an example of case B
large region j small region j
CL Poisson CL Poisson
Region-industry specic regressor xsjk:
(a)
@ logE(nsj)
@xsjk 2.9290 3.1883 3.18778 3.18832
(b)
@ logE(nsi)
@xsjk -0.2593 0 -0.00054 0
(c)
@ logE(ns)
@xsjk 0 0.2593 0 0.00054
(d)
@ logE(nj)
@xsjk 0.1110 0.1208 0.09624 0.09626
(e)
@ logE(ni)
@xsjk -0.0095 0 -0.00002 0
(f)
@ logE(n)
@xsjk 0 0.0106 0 0.00002
Region specic regressor xjk:
(g)
@ logE(nj)
@xjk 0.3873 0.42577 0.42548 0.42577
(h)
@ logE(ni)
@xjk -0.0378 0 -0.00004 0
(i)
@ logE(n)
@xjk 0 0.0374 0 0.00010
Notes: large region: j = Lisbon; small region: j = Oleiros; i = Porto in
rows (e) and (h); k = \industry-specic agglomeration" in rows (a) to
(f), k = \total manufacturing agglomeration" in rows (g) to (i); sector:
s = ISIC 351 (Industrial Chemicals) in 1989 in rows (a) to (f); any sector
in rows (g) to (i).
the share of regional employment in the same industry as the relevant rm. Their region level
regressor of main interest, xjk, is \total manufacturing agglomeration", dened as the log of
aggregate manufacturing employment per square kilometer.
Taking their estimated parameters and computing the empirical probabilities (18)-(21),
we can calculate all the implied elasticities of Table 2. Since the probabilities (18)-(21) vary
by region and industry, we need to select specic cases for the computation of elasticities. We
provide illustrations for two base regions j: Lisbon, the largest region in terms of ^ Pjjj>0, and
Oleiros, the smallest region in terms of ^ Pjjj>0 that still had non-zero rm counts in the larger
industry considered.11
Table 3 shows the implied elasticities for changes in a region-industry specic regressor
and in a region specic regressor. We can take these estimates to illustrate Observations
2 to 4.
 Observation 2: Own-region elasticities are larger in the Poisson model than in the
11Where a comparison region i needs to be specied for the computation of cross elasticities, we choose
Porto, the second largest region in the data set. Where an industry s needs to be specied, we choose
Industrial Chemicals (ISIC 351) in 1989, the largest sector-year pair in the dataset (31 observed choices, i.e. 4
percent of the total of 758 choices).
14conditional logit (rows (a), (d) and (g)). We can see that the dierence between implied
own-region elasticities is non-trivial for the large region (some 10 percent) but very small
for the small region (less than 0.1 percent). This illustrates that the dierence between
implied own-region elasticities of the two models vanishes as the number of regions grows
large and individual regions therefore become small.
 Observation 3: All Poisson cross-region elasticities are zero (rows (b), (e) and (h)).
 Observation 4: In the conditional logit model, the total number of rms (across all of
Portugal) is invariant to changes in the values of xsjk or xjk whereas in the Poisson
model the total changes with xsjk or xjk (rows (c), (f) and (i)). The eect on the total
number of rms of a given change in xsjk is stronger if the change occurs in a large
region.
These computations illustrate the qualitatively dierent predictions implied by the condi-
tional logit and Poisson models. With J = 275 spatial alternatives and s = 151 industries,
the underlying data set is highly disaggregated, implying relatively modest quantitative dif-
ferences between implied elasticities. Nonetheless, even here some of the dierences are far
from negligible. Perhaps the most striking dierence appears in row (c) of Table 3. A one-unit
change in xsjk of Lisbon leaves the number of Portuguese plants in industry s unchanged in
the conditional logit framework, while it increases by up to 29 percent in the Poisson model.
Policy makers ought not to ignore a dierence of such magnitude.
4 Conclusions
We show that the three standard location choice models - conditional logit, nested logit and
Poisson - are observationally equivalent in terms of cross-section estimation yet imply starkly
dierent predictions.
Take a corporate tax cut in a particular region. Provided that this is perceived by rms
as making that region more attractive, all three models imply that the region itself will see an
increase in its number of rms. We show that the magnitude of the implied increase diers:
it is largest if the world is properly represented by the Poisson model, smallest if the world
conforms with the conditional logit, and somewhere in-between if the world is nested logit. In
a Poisson world, the tax cut will have no impact on rm counts in any other of regions within
the data set. It will, however, pull rms away from other regions in the conditional logit and
the nested logit cases. As the total number of rms is xed in the conditional logit, the sum
of the rms pulled away from the other regions is the same as the increase in the number
15of rms in the tax-cutting region itself. The nested logit again represents an intermediate
case, with some of the attracted rms relocating from elsewhere within the data set, implying
that regional corporate tax bases are \rival"; and some rms appearing from outside that
set, implying a \non-rival" tax base. The same logic can be applied to residential choices of
private households with respect, for instance, to changes in local property tax rates.
Empirical researchers should be aware of the interpretational ambiguity aecting estimated
parameters in standard location choice models, particularly if the number of locations and
industries distinguished in the data is small. It can therefore be useful to report both condi-
tional logit and Poisson elasticity estimates as bounds on the eects implied by the estimated
parameters.
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17Appendix: Derivations for case B
Grouped conditional logit
The conditional logit model for grouped data is given by the probability that a given rm f
of industry s chooses region j


































The expected number of rms in region j and industry s is



















E(nsj) = ns = Ns;








































where Psjj = E(nsj)=E(nj):











































and the corresponding elasticities for a region-industry specic shock xsjk and a region-specic








The Poisson model for grouped data is given as
E(nsj) = sj = e
s+x0
sj;













































































































where Psjj = E(nsj)=E(nj).















































and the corresponding elasticities for a region-industry specic shock xsjk and a region-specic



















where Pj = E(nj)=E(n).
Grouped nested logit
The nested logit model for grouped data is given by the probability that rm f of industry s


























si) = Pj>0js  Pjjj>0;s = (1   P0js)Pjjj>0;s;


























+ Ns0 log(Ns0) + Ns log(Ns)   (Ns + Ns0)log(Ns + Ns0)g:
The expected number of rms in domestic region j > 0 and industry s is
E(nsj) = (ns + ns0)Pjjs = (ns + ns0)(1   P0js)Pjjj>0;s;




= [1   Pjjj>0;s(1   P0js)]k;
@ logE(nsi)
@xsjk
=  Pjjj>0;s(1   P0js)k:




E(nsj) = (ns + ns0)(1   P0js);































=  Pjjj>0;s(1   P0js)Psjik;
where Psjj = E(nsj)=E(nj):











































and the corresponding elasticities for a region-industry specic shock xsjk and a region-specic




































where Pj = E(nj)=E(n).
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